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In this paper we examine in a game theoretic framework in how far market
conditions facilitating start-up formation positively aﬀect technical change and
ﬁrms’ proﬁts. We consider a model in which R&D eﬀorts of an incumbent ﬁrm
generate technological know-how embodied in key R&D employees, who might use
this know-how to form a start-up. Market conditions, in particular the availability
of complementary assets, inﬂuence whether new ﬁrms are created and determine
expected proﬁts for start-up-founders. Easy availability of complementary assets
has the direct eﬀect that the generation of start-ups, which leads to the diﬀusion
and duplication of know-how, is fostered. However, incentives of incumbent ﬁrms
to invest in R&D might be reduced because of the increased danger of knowledge
loss through spin-out formation. We fully characterize the eﬀects of an increase in
the availability of complementary assets, demonstrating that under certain market
conditions the eﬀects on innovative activities and industry proﬁts can be negative.
Keywords: Complementary Assets, Technical Change, R&D Eﬀort, Startup
JEL classiﬁcation: L20, M13, O30
1 Introduction
Innovation and diﬀusion of technology are widely recognized as being important drivers
of economic growth. A large literature has evolved studying at diﬀerent levels of aggre-
gation the mechanisms by which innovative technologies come about and make their
way into the economy. It is argued that the ﬂows of knowledge embodied in employees
often facilitate technological diﬀusion. A particular form of key employees’ mobility is
the creation of start-up ﬁrms. Empirical evidence shows indeed that the evolution of
∗Financial support from the German Science Foundation (DFG) under grant GRK1134/1 (Interna-
tional Research and Training Group ’Economic Behavior and Interaction Models - EBIM) and from the
Italian Ministry of Research under grant PRIN 2004 (Non Linear Models in Economics and Finance)
is gratefully acknowledged.
1many industries is to a large extent driven by the entry of start-ups formed by former
employees of incumbents (see, e.g., Dahl, Pedersen, and Dalum (2003); Klepper and
Sleeper (2005); Klepper (2004)). Accordingly, start-up generation is seen as an im-
portant mechanism for the propagation of technical change and economic growth (see,
e.g., Acs and Plummer (2005), Mueller (2007), or Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann
(2006)). However, as pointed out by Klepper (2001, p. 639) start-ups are sometimes
seen as “parasites feeding oﬀ the innovative eﬀorts of their parents, aided by ’vulture’
capitalists that help them get started”, alluding to the possibility of key employees
leaving their employment to start their own ﬁrm in the same industry. Arguably, the
threat of the establishment of a start-up can have a distorting eﬀect on the incentives
of incumbents to innovate.
To better understand the tension between these two opposite forces one needs to
further investigate the factors presiding start-up formation. Much of the literature has
stressed that the skills and know-how acquired in previous employment are important
factors for start-up formation (see, e.g., Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005),
and Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1989)). Furthermore, starting with Teece (1986)
a rich literature has pointed out the importance of diﬀerent kinds of complementary
assets for the creation of new ﬁrms. These assets range from access to distribution and
purchasing channels to organizational and managerial skills1.
Easy access to complementary assets, encouraging the formation of start-ups is gen-
erally regarded as a factor facilitating innovation and fostering technological change2.
More complementary assets, however, by rendering easier for a key employee to found a
start-up, imply also a potential knowledge loss and increased costs related to threatened
start-up formation, adversely aﬀecting incumbent ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in inno-
vation. While the beneﬁcial eﬀects of an economic environment favorable to start-up
formation are well understood, we still lack a clear understanding of its consequences
on incumbent ﬁrms’ innovative eﬀorts.
Our main goal in this paper is to shed light on the latter eﬀects, by investigating
the impact of the availability of complementary assets on the strategic interactions
between an incumbent ﬁrm and a key R&D employee when property rights are not
enforceable3. The ﬁrm is assumed to make R&D expenses to generate new knowledge,
which is however embodied in the employee (a positive externality increasing her outside
options). The latter faces the opportunity to found a start-up that will eventually
compete with the incumbent in the same industry. In order to do so, however, she
needs to have access to a key complementary asset. If the employee leaves the ﬁrm
to found a start-up, only a fraction of the knowledge generated through R&D remains
with the incumbent, who then suﬀers a reduction in proﬁts both because of its inability
to fully appropriate the returns from R&D investments and because of the presence of
1Needless to say, many other variables have an inﬂuence on the start-up formation process. For
instance, Hellmann (2007) shows that innovation and entrepreneurship are inﬂuenced by company
policies as well as by the entrepreneurial environment and the allocation of intellectual property rights.
2An example of complementary asset that has received substantial attention in the literature is the
availability of ﬁnancial resources and especially venture capital. For instance, the country reports of
the European Innovation Scoreboard, published annually by the European Commission, regard early
stage venture ﬁnancing as a key indicator of the innovation potential of a region.
3See for example Anton and Yao (1994, 1995) for a discussion of the many instances in which
property rights are weak or absent.
2a further competitor in the industry.
The value of the knowledge stock generated by R&D activities is common knowl-
edge, so that the ﬁrm and the employee bargain over the size of the wage premium
that the ﬁrm is willing to pay in order to prevent the employee from leaving. In case of
disagreement, the employee leaves the ﬁrm (to found a start-up) and her payoﬀ is then
determined through bargaining with the provider of key complementary assets. Hence,
the value of the employee’s outside option depends ultimately on the availability of
these assets.
On the one hand, by choosing the level of R&D eﬀort, the ﬁrm inﬂuences the em-
ployee’s incentives to create a start-up and therefore whether in equilibrium a new ﬁrm
will form or not. On the other hand, R&D expenses positively aﬀect the incumbent’s
proﬁts for a given market structure. The interplay of these two eﬀects determines the
investment decision of the ﬁrm, crucially depending on the availability of complemen-
tary assets4.
If complementary assets are easily available, the employee’s outside option when
negotiating employment conditions with the ﬁrm (given the employee opportunity of
founding a start-up) is of high value. Potentially, this entails a higher probability of
disagreement between the ﬁrm and the key employee (resulting in the formation of
a start-up), or a larger compensation received by the employee in case an agreement
is reached. Both eﬀects imply reduced incentives for the incumbent to invest in the
accumulation of R&D knowledge. Once a start-up is formed, however, the overall bar-
gaining power of the employee when dealing with the provider of the complementary
assets only aﬀects the allocation of the start-up proﬁts between the two, without inﬂu-
encing any longer the ﬁrm’s innovative eﬀorts. Hence, the incumbent’s investment in
R&D knowledge is strictly decreasing for levels of complementary assets availability at
which a start-up does not form, and remains constant, although ineﬃciently provided,
for higher degrees of availability. Two sources of ineﬃciencies arise: ex ante, there is
under-investment associated to the distortions in the incumbent’s incentives to inno-
vate, and ex post, there is the possibility that no start-up is formed even if aggregate
industry proﬁts would rise should start-up formation occur.
It is interesting to note that, although an increase in the availability of complemen-
tary assets harms the incumbent by improving the outside options of the key employee,
the latter does not necessarily beneﬁt from this increase. There are indeed two opposite
eﬀects at work: a direct eﬀect, implying that for a given level of R&D knowledge an
increase in the employee’s outside options rises the fraction of the incumbent’s proﬁts
she obtains; and a strategic eﬀect, due to the decreasing incentives of the ﬁrm to invest
in R&D, which in turn reduces ﬁrm proﬁts. Taken together the direct and the strategic
eﬀects imply that the employee receives a higher fraction of a shrinking joint surplus,
so that the larger availability of complementary assets can indeed harm the employee
as well as the incumbent. In fact, we will show that there are cases in which ex post,
given the R&D investment of the incumbent, the employee has an incentive to create a
start-up, although she would be better oﬀ committing ex ante not to form it. A result
that resembles closely to a hold-up problem.
4More generally, it is clear that the parent ﬁrm’s investment decisions depend on its overall bargain-
ing power when dealing with the potential start-up founder. Besides the availability of complementary
assets, other factors aﬀect start-up formation, such as the institutional setup and market characteristics.
3The main argument sketched above has important policy implications. It is com-
monly agreed that economic environments facilitating start-up formation support the
diﬀusion of new ideas and innovations and, via this channel, economic growth (see
e.g. Acs and Szerb (2006)). On the contrary, we argue that such economic environ-
ments may have a negative distorting impact on ﬁrms’ R&D expenditures. Even in
the limit case in which all necessary complementary assets become “freely”available
(e.g. because of policy programs), the incumbent still under-invests in R&D due to the
eﬀect of complementary assets availability on its incentives, which may cast doubts
also on the implications of public programs aimed at providing support to potential
start-ups.
Investigating the tradeoﬀ between positive (reduction of ex-post ineﬃciencies) and
negative (increase of investment distortions) eﬀects of economic environments that fos-
ter start-up formation is the key contribution of this paper. To put our results in the
right perspective, however, it is important to stress that several positive eﬀects of start-
up formation commonly emphasized in the literature (such as knowledge spillovers,
inter-temporal eﬀects of cluster formation; see, e.g., Audretsch and Feldman (2004))
are not taken into account here.
Two streams of literature are closely related to our analysis. First, several papers
have focused on the eﬀects of potential worker mobility on investment and technology
choice decisions of ﬁrms. For instance, Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003) observe that
the possibility of employees moving to direct competitors has a negative impact on the
equilibrium investments in innovative activities. B¨ ohm and Colombo (2006) show in a
general equilibrium framework that the possibility of experienced employees becoming
entrepreneurs may discourage the choice to adopt better technologies by incumbent
ﬁrms. Although both papers consider spillovers through the labor market, the eﬀects of
complementary assets on start-up formation do not play any role there. The negative
strategic eﬀect arising in our framework resembles also the impact of weak patent
systems on incentives to invest in innovative activities, which has been extensively
discussed in the literature (see, e.g., the survey by Gallini and Scotchmer (2002)).
Second, the factors inﬂuencing if and how start-ups are formed have been investigated
in a number of papers. Related to our setup are, in particular, Anton and Yao (1994,
2002), Anand and Galetovic (2000, 2004) and Baccara and Razin (2004), who study
strategies to prevent, or form and ﬁnance, the formation of start-ups by employees
of an incumbent ﬁrm. While these papers carefully analyze diﬀerent aspects of the
start-up formation process with absent or weak property rights, they do not link these
considerations to the ex-ante incentives of ﬁrms to invest in innovative activities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 inves-
tigates the inﬂuence of complementary assets on the investment in innovation by the
incumbent ﬁrm, and the process of start-up formation. Section 4 studies the impact
of the allocation of bargaining power between the ﬁrm and the employee on start-up
formation, while Section 5 concentrates on the possibility of the formation of a spinoﬀ
where the complementary assets are provided by the incumbent. Finally, Section 6
focuses on policy implications, and on a discussion of the main results. In Appendix
A we exemplify our general framework through a standard duopoly model with linear
demand and quality improving R&D. All ﬁgures in the paper have been produced using
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Figure 1: The structure of the multi-stage game.
2 The Model
We consider the interaction between a ﬁrm (F) and a key R&D employee (E). The ﬁrm
invests I(KE), in order to generate new knowledge KE, which is however embodied in
the employee. The employee may found a start-up company, which then competes with
ﬁrm F. In order to do so complementary assets are needed, which may be ﬁnancial
resources, organizational and managerial know-how or the access to relevant factor
markets and distribution channels. The assets are provided by a third party at a cost
Ms(KE). The more advanced the technology is the larger are the costs of providing
these assets. If no start-up is created the ﬁrm earns a proﬁt πm
F (KE) in the market. In
case E establishes a start-up she takes her embodied knowledge (KE) with her leaving
a knowledge stock KF ≤ KE with the ﬁrm. The proﬁts earned by the incumbent ﬁrm
and the employee (founding a start-up) in this case are πs
F(KF,KE) and πs
E(KF,KE),
respectively. The strategic incentives of the ﬁrm and of the employee are analyzed in a
two-stage game (see Figure 1):
Stage 1: the ﬁrm chooses the stock of knowledge KE to be generated, and sustains
the costs I(KE). The knowledge is embodied in the employee. If she leaves, only a
stock KF = δKE,0 < δ < 1, remains in the ﬁrm.
We make standard assumptions concerning decreasing marginal eﬀects of R&D
eﬀorts. Given that if a start-up forms the knowledge stocks of both the incumbent
ﬁrm and the start-up are functions of KE, in what follows we simplify the notation by
writing πs
F(KE),πs




π(0) = 0,π(KE)′ > 0




Ms(0) = 0,Ms(KE)′ > 0.
Deﬁne ∆πF as the loss in proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm when a start-up is formed
and ∆πE as the net proﬁt of the start-up.
∆πF (KE) := πm
F (KE) − πs
F(KE),
∆πE (KE) := πs
E(KE) − Ms(KE).
We assume that the creation of a start-up harms the incumbent ﬁrm and that the
marginal return on additional knowledge for the incumbent is always positive and larger
if the employee stays in the ﬁrm than if she creates a start-up. Also, since our focus is on
the impact of the threat of start-up formation on investment incentives of the incumbent
ﬁrm, we let the net proﬁts of a start-up be positive and larger than the losses suﬀered
by the incumbent. Hence, it would be eﬃcient to form a start-up. Moreover, this eﬀect
becomes stronger the larger the knowledge stock of the employee is. Furthermore, we
assume that higher knowledge implies a larger market size, meaning that the positive
eﬀect of knowledge duplication on total industry proﬁts becomes larger the more is
invested in R&D. This is summarized by:
Assumption 2
∆πE(KE) > ∆πF(KE) > 0,
∆π′
E(KE) > ∆π′
F(KE) > 0 ∀KE > 0.
Our ﬁnal assumption ensures that the optimal investment level is positive and ﬁnite.
Assumption 3 The shape of the cost function for generating knowledge guarantees
positive optimal investment and convexity of net industry proﬁts with respect to KE:

















Stage 2: In the second stage the size of the knowledge stock KE is common knowledge.
The ﬁrm and the employee bargain over the size of a wage bonus b that the ﬁrm is
willing to pay to prevent the employee from leaving. The bargaining power of the ﬁrm
in these negotiations is denoted by ξ ∈ (0,1). With probability ξ [subgame 2] the
ﬁrm oﬀers a bonus bF, which the employee accepts or rejects; with probability (1 − ξ)
[subgame 3] the employee demands a bonus bE and the ﬁrm accepts or rejects it. In
6both cases, if the oﬀer/demand is accepted, the employee stays in the ﬁrm and the
payoﬀs of the two players are
P21
F = πm
F (KE) − I(KE) − bF, P31
F = πm
F (KE) − I(KE) − bE
P21
E = bF, P31
E = bE.
If there is disagreement the employee leaves the ﬁrm and her payoﬀ is determined
through bargaining with a provider of the needed complementary assets. If the (former)
employee is not able to obtain the necessary complementary assets from the current
negotiation partner she has to ﬁnd another provider. This would need search time,
and therefore the payoﬀs earned by the employee after the search would have to be
discounted by a factor α ∈ (0,1). The more easily complementary assets are available
the shorter is the necessary search time and the larger is α. We assume that the outcome
of the bargaining, which determines the distribution of the start-up ownership between
the founder and the provider of the necessary assets, is given by a generalized Nash
bargaining solution, where β ∈ (0,1) denotes the bargaining power of the employee.
We denote by x the amount allocated to the employee in the bargaining and assume for
simplicity that all potential alternative providers are identical. Thus the threat-points
of the start-up founder and the provider are αx and Ms, respectively. The joint surplus




x = αx + β(πs




1 − α(1 − β)
(πs
E(KE) − Ms).
Given that the employee has to search for a provider when deciding to found a start-up






1 − α(1 − β)
∈ (0,1)
measures the overall bargaining power of the start-up founder when dealing with a
provider of complementary assets. All-together, we obtain the following payoﬀs of the




F(KE) − I(KE) (1)
P22
E = P32
E = γ∆πE(KE). (2)
The parameter γ is a natural proxy for the availability of complementary assets. Al-
though the notion of γ is rather abstract in our setup one can provide several economic
interpretations of it. There are numerous reasons why the access of potential founders
to assets needed for start-up formation may be restricted. For instance, private equity
markets may not be suﬃciently developed, necessary organizational, legal or manage-
rial advice may be costly to access, market regulations may impose high barriers for
7establishment of a ﬁrm, or dominant incumbent ﬁrms may restrict the access of start-
ups to vertically related ‘assets’ like distribution channels or the supply of production
factors.
3 R&D Investment and Start-up Formation
The main goal of our analysis is to investigate the strategic eﬀect of the availability
of complementary assets on ﬁrm investment and start-up formation. The presence of
a provider of complementary assets – by allowing the creation of a start-up – implies
that the incumbent ﬁrm on the margin acquires less than the full return on investment.
Accordingly, one would expect a downward distortion in the investment incentives of
the incumbent.
Note that, by Assumption 2, the total market proﬁts (those of the incumbent plus
those of the potential start-up) are always larger when a start-up forms. Accordingly,








E(KE) − I(KE)]. (3)
This eﬃcient level is used as a benchmark in the following analysis of equilibrium
outcomes.
The game described in the previous section is an extensive form game with per-
fect information. We characterize its subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) using






then in equilibrium a start-up is formed. Inequality (4) is equivalent to G(KE;γ) > 0,
where
G(KE;γ) := −∆πF(KE) + γ∆πE(KE). (5)
Notice that the same condition implies that a start-up emerges in equilibrium in sub-
game 3 as well. The function G(KE;γ) gives the joint net proﬁts increase for the
incumbent ﬁrm and the start-up5. In equilibrium the employee creates a new ﬁrm if
and only if the joint proﬁt increase G(KE;γ) is positive.
We deﬁne a set ˆ KE such that for all KE ∈ ˆ KE one has G(KE;γ) ≤ 0, meaning
that a start-up does not form. If KE ∈ ˆ KE then in equilibrium the equalities
bF (KE) = γ∆πE(KE)) > 0
and
bE = ∆πF(KE) > 0
hold.




Hm (KE;γ) if KE ∈ ˆ KE
Hs (KE) otherwise
,
5We explicitly indicate the dependence of G on γ since our analysis focuses on variations in γ.
8where
Hm (KE;γ) := πs
F(KE) − ξG(KE;γ) − I (KE) (6)
Hs (KE) := πs
F(KE) − I (KE). (7)
Under Assumption (3), Hm (KE;γ) and Hs (KE;γ) are strictly concave functions.
Note further that KE ∈ ˆ KE if and only if Hm (KE;γ) ≥ Hs (KE;γ). Therefore, at
stage 1, the ﬁrm maximizes over the upper envelope of Hm and Hs.
We deﬁne:
¯ KE,m (γ) = argmax
KE
Hm (KE;γ) > 0, ¯ KE,s = argmax
KE
Hs (KE) > 0, (8)
where the positivity of the argmax follows from Assumption 3. It should be noted that
Hs(KE) and hence also ¯ KE,s are independent of γ. Deﬁne
K∗




as the equilibrium level of the incument’s R&D investment. Clearly, one has that
K∗
E (γ) ∈ { ¯ KE,m (γ), ¯ KE,s}.
It should also be noted that, on the one hand, by choosing KE the ﬁrm inﬂuences
the employee’s incentives to create a new ﬁrm, and therefore whether in equilibrium
a start-up forms or not. On the other hand, KE aﬀects the incumbent’s proﬁts for
a given market structure. The interplay of these two eﬀects determines the optimal
investment, which crucially depends on the bargaining power of the employee with the
provider of the complementary assets, γ. As for the impact of γ on ¯ KE,m (γ) and ¯ KE,s,
we obtain
Lemma 1
(i) ∂Hm (KE;γ)/∂γ < 0 ∀KE;
(ii) ∂ ¯ KE,m (γ)/∂γ < 0; ∂ ¯ KE,s/∂γ = 0




Points ii) and iii) of the Lemma are illustrated in Figure 2 where we depict the
typical shapes of the investment levels ¯ KE,m (γ) and ¯ KE,s as functions of γ6.
It is now straightforward to characterize the SPNE of the game for diﬀerent values
of γ.
6All ﬁgures are drawn for a particular instance of our setting with a linear demand structure and
vertical and horizontal diﬀerentiation between the goods oﬀered by the incumbent and the start-up.
The corresponding model, based on Symeonidis (2003), is described in details in Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Investment levels ¯ KE,m (γ) and ¯ KE,s for γ ∈ [0,1]
Proposition 2
(i) There exists a unique value ¯ γ ∈ (0,1] such that, for all γ < ¯ γ, in the unique
SPNE one has K∗
E (γ) = ¯ KE,m and no start-up is formed. For all γ > ¯ γ, in the
unique SPNE one has K∗
E (γ) = ¯ KE,s and a start-up is formed.




The proposition illustrates the strategic eﬀects of the availability of complementary
assets on the ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort. If complementary assets are easily available (high
γ), then the employee’s outside option when negotiating employment conditions with
the ﬁrm (given the employee’s opportunity of founding a start-up) is high. This has
three potential eﬀects: ﬁrst, it increases the possibility of disagreement, which results
in the establishment of a start-up; second, in the case of agreement, it increases the
compensation that the employee receives from the ﬁrm; and third, it reduces the ﬁrm’s
incentives to invest in the generation of new knowledge.
The last eﬀect is formally illustrated by the observation that ¯ KE,m (γ) is decreasing
in γ. Note, however, that when a start-up is created, then γ only inﬂuences the net
surplus allocation between the employee and the provider of complementary assets;
hence, the incumbent’s incentives to invest in R&D are independent of γ (i.e. ¯ KE,s
is constant in γ). The second part of the proposition shows that, no matter whether
a start-up is formed or not, the ﬁrm’s incentives to invest fall short of the eﬃcient
benchmark due to the fact that part of the total surplus generated by start-up formation
are not appropriated by the ﬁrm.
We now investigate how the incentives to invest in R&D in the start-up case compare
with those in the case in which the ﬁrm retains the employee. Intuition might suggest
10that the ﬁrm’s incentives to invest are larger if in equilibrium no start-up is formed
and all the knowledge generated stays within the incumbent ﬁrm. In what follows, we
will characterize under which circumstances the inequality ¯ KE,m(γ) > ¯ KE,s is indeed
satisﬁed. In order to do so we distinguish between two cases. Denote by ǫF(KE) the
elasticity of the incumbent’s losses due to start-up formation with respect to KE, and










If the elasticity of the incumbent’s losses caused by start-up formation is smaller than
the elasticity of the start-up’s proﬁts with respect to KE, i.e. ǫF(KE) < ǫE(KE) for all
KE > 0, we say that knowledge has a slow market expanding eﬀect. If this inequality
is reversed for all KE > 0 we say that knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect.
Note that, on the one hand, in the case of a fast market expanding eﬀect, for large
levels of KE, R&D investments have mainly a business stealing eﬀect, meaning that
most additional proﬁts gained by the start-up are at the expenses of the incumbent
ﬁrm. On the other hand, with slow market expansion, the positive eﬀect of additional
R&D expenditures on total industry proﬁts grows with the total level of R&D eﬀort.
Figure 3 illustrates slow and fast market expanding eﬀects for the linear demand case
with quality improving R&D described in Appendix A7.
E S '
F E S S ' ' ,
F S '
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Eﬀect of R&D investments on ∆πF and ∆πE in case of slow market expanding
(a) and fast market expanding (b) eﬀects.
The following proposition shows that, on the one hand, when knowledge has a slow
market expanding eﬀect the availability of complementary assets must be high in order
to foster the creation of a new ﬁrm. Furthermore, the optimal investment level of a
ﬁrm that is able to prevent the employee from leaving is not necessarily above the level
that would be optimal if a start-up forms. On the other hand, when knowledge has
7In our example with quality improving R&D a crucial factor distinguishing between the cases
of slow and fast market expanding eﬀects is the elasticity of product quality with respect to R&D
investments. A high elasticity corresponds to a slow market expanding eﬀect, whereas low elasticity
implies a fast market expanding eﬀect. See Appendix A for details.
11a fast market expanding eﬀect, the minimal availability of complementary assets that
leads to the creation of a new ﬁrm is comparatively small, and investments in cases
where a start-up is founded are always smaller than in cases where the employee stays
in the ﬁrm.
Proposition 3
(i) If knowledge has a slow market expanding eﬀect, then ¯ γ > ˆ γ and for all γ ∈ (ˆ γ,¯ γ)
no start-up is created but the R&D investment of the incumbent is below the
optimal investment under start-up formation: ¯ KE,m(γ) < ¯ KE,s.
(ii) If knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect, then ¯ γ < ˆ γ. Whenever a start-
up is not formed the R&D investment of the incumbent is above the optimal
investment under start-up formation: ¯ KE,m(γ) > ¯ KE,s for all γ ≤ ¯ γ.
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Figure 4: Optimal R&D investment for varying availability of complementary assets
(γ) in the cases of slow market expanding (a) and fast market expanding (b) eﬀects of
investment.
Figure 4 illustrates Proposition 3. The upward jump depicted in Figure 4(a) might
be surprising at ﬁrst, considering that for γ < ¯ γ the incumbent retains all generated
knowledge in the ﬁrm, while for γ > ¯ γ it partly looses it. To gain an intuition for this
observation, note that start-up formation occurs only if the induced increase in industry
proﬁts is large enough to account for the proﬁt share accruing to the provider of the
complementary assets. In the case of slow market expansion, the additional industry
proﬁt at the optimal investment level is (relatively) small. Hence, for a large range of
values of γ, additional proﬁts can not account for the proﬁt share of the provider of the
complementary assets, and no start-up is formed. This implies that the main eﬀect of
an increase of γ is an improvement of the employee’s position in the bargaining process
with the incumbent. Such a negative incentive eﬀect occurs for a wider interval of γ
values than in the fast market expanding case. In fact, under slow market expansion, ¯ γ
is so large that (at ¯ γ) the negative incentive eﬀect outweighs the direct eﬀect of potential
knowledge loss. Hence, anticipating the creation of a start-up increases the incumbent’s
12incentives to invest in R&D. The opposite occurs in the fast market expanding case, in
which (since ¯ γ is small) the range of γ values such that no start-up forms is so small
that the direct eﬀect dominates.
The following corollary, directly implied by Lemma 1 and Proposition 3, summarizes
our insights concerning the impact of the availability of complementary assets on the
incumbent’s investment incentives.
Corollary 4 If knowledge has slow (fast) market expanding eﬀects, the optimal invest-
ment K∗
E(γ) is strictly decreasing for γ < ¯ γ, it exhibits an upward (downward) jump at
γ = ¯ γ and it is constant for γ > ¯ γ.
Also observe that Corollary 4 and Lemma 1 together imply that K∗
E (γ) < ¯ KE,m (0)
for all γ ∈ (0,1], where ¯ KE,m (0) is the eﬃcient level of R&D investments for all levels
of γ for which no start-up is formed. Moreover, it follows from Assumption 2 that the
eﬃcient level of KE is even larger than ¯ KE,m (0) when a start-up is formed. Therefore,
there is always under-provision of R&D eﬀort by the incumbent, regardless of whether
a start-up is generated or not.
We now turn to the dependence of proﬁts on the availability of complementary
assets. Denote by P∗
F (γ) and P∗
E (γ) the set of SPNE payoﬀs of the ﬁrm and the
employee, respectively. In general, P∗
F (γ) and P∗
E (γ) are correspondences, but Lemma
9 in Appendix B establishes that these correspondences are almost everywhere single-
valued and continuous. Concerning the behavior of the proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm
and of the start-up founder with respect to the availability of complementary assets,
we can state:
Proposition 5
(i) The equilibrium proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrm are strictly decreasing in γ for γ < ¯ γ
and constant in γ otherwise;
(ii) The equilibrium proﬁts of the employee are strictly increasing in γ for the range
of γ-values where a start-up is formed;
(iii) If knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect then the employee’s equilibrium
proﬁts exhibit a downward jump for increasing γ at γ = ¯ γ.
There is a clear economic intuition for Proposition 5. When a start-up is formed,
the proﬁts and the investment level of the incumbent are unaﬀected by γ, since this
parameter does not determine the size of the start-up’s proﬁts, but only their alloca-
tion between the provider of complementary assets and its founder. Given that the
incumbent’s investment level does not change, the proﬁts of the start-up founder are
obviously increasing as her bargaining power with the provider of the required comple-
mentary assets increases. On the contrary, if no start-up is created, γ aﬀects the value
of the employee’s outside options when bargaining with the ﬁrm, and the incumbent’s
proﬁts are strictly decreasing in γ. The fact that the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is decreasing in γ
does not necessarily imply that the employee proﬁts from an increase in the availability
of complementary assets. Two eﬀects are at work: (i) a direct eﬀect, implying that for
a given level of KE an increase in the employee’s outside option raises the fraction of
13the ﬁrm’s proﬁts πm
F (KE) she obtains; (ii) an indirect strategic eﬀect, due to the fact
that as γ increases the incentives of the ﬁrm to invest in R&D, and accordingly its
proﬁts πm
F (KE), diminish. Together, the direct and the strategic eﬀects imply that the
employee receives a larger fraction of a shrinking joint surplus, so that the net eﬀect can
be negative and a larger availability of complementary assets can harm the employee.
Although for low and high values of γ the employee’s payoﬀ rises if the availability
of complementary assets increases, there is an intermediate range in which increasing
γ has a negative eﬀect on P∗
E. Since the incumbent’s proﬁts are strictly decreasing
in γ, in that range reducing the availability of complementary assets would induce a
Pareto improvement. This eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 5, from which it is also evident
that for a slow market expanding eﬀect the increase of γ across the threshold ¯ γ might
induce an upward jump of the employee’s proﬁts. Contrary to the case of a fast market












Figure 5: Firm’s and employee’s proﬁts for varying availability of complementary assets
(γ) in the cases of slow market expanding eﬀects of investment.
When knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect the relevance of the strategic
eﬀect becomes particularly apparent if the parameter γ moves from the range in which
no start-up is formed to the start-up region. In this case, the strategic eﬀect induces a
downward jump in the ﬁrm’s R&D eﬀort and, as shown in the third claim of Proposition
5, this results in a discontinuous reduction in the employee’s payoﬀs. Ex post, given the
investment in R&D knowledge by the incumbent ﬁrm, the employee has an incentive
to establish her own ﬁrm. However, she would be better oﬀ by committing ex ante
not to form the start-up. Put diﬀerently a hold-up problem arises (inducing ineﬃcient
investment by the incumbent), which could be avoided if the employee were able to
14commit not to leave the ﬁrm.
4 The Inﬂuence of the Incumbent’s Bargaining Power on
Start-up Formation
The incumbent ﬁrm’s investment incentives are not only inﬂuenced by the availability
of complementary assets but also by its bargaining power when negotiating with the
potential start-up founder. We do not focus on the factors determining the ﬁrm’s
bargaining power ξ, but we interpret it as a proxy of the intensity of competition in the
labor market for workers with R&D skills. On the one hand, if the supply of potential
R&D employees on the market is strong, the ﬁrm has a relatively strong position when
bargaining with the potential start-up founder, and ξ is large. On the other hand, if
R&D skills are scarce on the market, ξ is assumed to be low. It is straightforward to see
that an increase in the incumbent’s bargaining power increases the minimal availability
of complementary assets that leads to start-up formation.
Lemma 6 The threshold ¯ γ at which a start-up forms is strictly increasing in the ﬁrm’s
bargaining power ξ whenever ¯ γ  = ˆ γ. When ¯ γ = ˆ γ for some ξ ∈ (0,1) then ¯ γ = ˆ γ for
all ξ ∈ (0,1).
An implication of Lemma 6 is that if the availability of complementary assets is
too low for the formation of a start-up, but just slightly below the threshold ¯ γ, then a
decrease in the ﬁrm’s bargaining power with employee leads to the creation of a start-
up. In the light of the interpretation of ξ given above this implies that a decrease of
the supply of potential R&D employees in the labor market can facilitate the creation
of start-ups.
In the following proposition we show, on the one hand, that no start-ups are formed
regardless of the ﬁrm’s bargaining power if the availability of complementary assets
is low. On the other hand, when the availability of complementary assets is above a
threshold, start-ups always form if the bargaining power of the ﬁrm is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 7 There exists a ˜ γ ∈ [0,1] such that if γ < ˜ γ no start-up is formed
regardless of the value of ξ. If γ > ˜ γ then there exists a ¯ ξ ∈ [0,1] such that a start-up
is formed if and only if ξ ≤ ¯ ξ.
To gain an intuitive understanding of the results in Proposition 7, consider a situ-
ation in which the availability of complementary assets is just suﬃcient to trigger the
creation of a start-up. An increase in the ﬁrm’s bargaining power ξ does not aﬀect
its payoﬀ as long as the formation of a start-up still occurs. However, the increase in
ξ induces an increase in the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ should it decide to retain the employee. As
a consequence, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts might become larger under the employee’s retention
than under the start-up formation scenario, in which case the increase in ξ results in a
discontinuous change in investment.
At ﬁrst sight it might seem counterintuitive that a decrease in the employee’s bar-
gaining power with the ﬁrm makes it more likely that she stays in the ﬁrm and no
start-up is created. The driving force of this eﬀect is the change in investment levels
15induced by the increase in ξ. A higher investment level makes it more likely that start-
up formation is eﬃcient, and therefore facilitates it. At the same time, however, since
the incumbent’s payoﬀ is not aﬀected by ξ if a start-up forms, while it is increasing
in ξ if no start-up is created, the ﬁrm has an incentive to retain the employee for ξ
suﬃciently large, and chooses its investment level accordingly.
5 Start-ups as Spinoﬀs of the Incumbent
In the analysis developed so far, three diﬀerent parties are involved in the start-up
formation process: the incumbent ﬁrm, the key employee and an external provider of
complementary assets. The latter is needed to realize the potential beneﬁts associated
to the formation of the start-up, but his presence negatively inﬂuences the results of the
bargaining between the incumbent and the employee. One may therefore ask whether
the eﬃciency of the start-up formation process could be improved if no third party
were involved. In order to address this issue, we consider a situation in which the
incumbent is able and willing to directly provide the needed complementary assets to
the employee. The resulting start-up is therefore a spinoﬀ of the incumbent ﬁrm. In
this case, the employee has the option to bargain with the incumbent the conditions
of spinoﬀ formation, instead of having to turn necessarily to an external provider of
complementary assets. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the costs of providing
the required complementary assets for the ﬁrm are identical to those of an external
provider, and hence given by Ms. To incorporate the option that the ﬁrm can enable
a spinoﬀ, we alter the bargaining game between the ﬁrm and the employee in such
a way that the agreement between the two can lead either to no spinoﬀ formation
with a bonus to the employee, or to the generation of a ﬁrm-enabled spinoﬀ where
the employee obtains a certain fraction of the proﬁts. Which of these two options is
chosen depends on the relative size of the joint surplus that is generated. As before,
the bargaining power of the ﬁrm is denoted by ξ.
Formally, we have a bargaining game between the ﬁrm and the employee in which
the outside options of the ﬁrm and of the employee are πs
F(KE) and γ∆πE(KE), re-
spectively. According to our considerations above the joint surplus is given by
S = max [πm
F (KE),πs
F(KE) + ∆πE(KE)].
Since total industry proﬁts are larger if a start-up (spinoﬀ) is formed by Assumption




It is easy to see that S always exceeds the sum of the outside options. Hence, a
spinoﬀ forms, and the amount allocated to the ﬁrm in the Nash bargaining solution is
given by πs
F(KE)+ξ(1−γ)∆πE(KE). From this we obtain that the objective function
of the ﬁrm when deciding about its R&D eﬀort level is given by ˜ Hs(KE,γ), with
˜ Hs(KE,γ) = πs
F(KE) + ξ(1 − γ)(πs
E(KE) − Ms) − I(KE).
16Accordingly, the optimal investment level of the ﬁrm in the case in which it has the
resources to support a spinoﬀ reads
˜ KF,s = argmax
KE
˜ Hs (KE;γ). (9)
In the following proposition we compare optimal investment levels and spinoﬀ for-
mation under internal provision with the case of external provision of complementary
assets, and with the eﬃcient benchmark.
Proposition 8
(i) If spinoﬀ formation is eﬃcient, then it always occurs under internal provision of
the required complementary assets.
(ii) The optimal level of R&D eﬀort with internal provision is strictly decreasing in γ
and always larger than the optimal level of R&D without internal provision, but
below the eﬃcient level K
eff
F .
As it is to be expected, the possibility of internal provision improves the ‘eﬃciency
properties’ of the outcome. More precisely, we reach the eﬃcient outcome in terms of
spinoﬀ formation, and investment levels increase compared to the scenario in which the
incumbent lacks the assets to enable a spinoﬀ. However, they fall short of the eﬃcient
amount.
The eﬃciency of spinoﬀ formation is related to the fact that the ﬁrm and the
employee can freely decide upon market structure without loosing any of the industry
proﬁts to a third party. Hence, they always choose the eﬃcient structure, which in
our case is one with spinoﬀ formation. When the potential start-up has to rely on an
external provider of complementary assets, choosing to form a start-up implies a loss
of parts of the overall surplus to a third party, and therefore the ﬁrm and the employee
may agree not to do so even if this is not eﬃcient.
There are two reasons for an ineﬃcient level of investment to arise. First, even with
internal provision, the ﬁrm appropriates only a fraction ξ of the generated overall sur-
plus: a version of the standard hold-up problem that remains unsolved when internal
provision is allowed for. Second, investment improves the outside options of the em-
ployee, causing a reduction on the incumbent’s incentives to invest ex ante, and hence
reducing the net surplus. It is worth stressing that the latter eﬀect becomes stronger
whenever the availability of complementary assets increases, which explains why (even
with internal provision) investment levels are decreasing in γ.
Finally, to understand why investment incentives improve compared to the case in
which the incumbent can not enable a spinoﬀ, it is useful to distinguish between the
situation in which, without internal provision, a start-up is formed and that in which it
is not. In the former, allowing for internal provision shifts part of the proﬁts generated
by the spinoﬀ from the external provider to the incumbent; hence, the incentives to
invest increase. In the latter, the results follow directly from the observation that the
marginal return on investment are larger if a spinoﬀ is formed.
176 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
The agenda of this paper is to study the eﬀect of the availability of complementary
assets on the process of start-up formation and on the R&D investments of potential
parent ﬁrms. Both these issues have eﬃciency implications. As our focus is on the
supply side, with a slight abuse of notation, we refer to deviations from maximal total
industry proﬁts as ineﬃciencies. As already noted two diﬀerent types of ineﬃciencies
may arise in our framework. If limited appropriability of returns to R&D investment by
the incumbent leads to under-investment, we face ex-ante ineﬃciencies occurring before
the decision about start-up formation is made. If no start-up is created although total
industry proﬁts could be increased by founding one, ex-post ineﬃciencies occur8. Of
course both types of ineﬃciencies might also occur simultaneously.
The policy debate focuses to a large extent on ex-post ineﬃciencies (too few start-
ups), hence calling for policies directed at increasing the availability of complementary
assets9. Interpreting our results with respect to these eﬃciency considerations more
reﬁned implications arise. Standard hold-up arguments establish that the formation
of start-ups always lead to ex-ante ineﬃciencies. However, we have shown that the
amount of under-investment depends crucially on parameters that can be inﬂuenced by
policy interventions. Furthermore, ex-post ineﬃciencies disappear for certain parameter
settings. More precisely, if we consider the scenario in which internal provision is not
an option, both ex-ante and ex-post ineﬃciencies occur for low values of γ. If the
availability of complementary assets increases, the R&D investment of the incumbent
decreases, and therefore ex-ante ineﬃciencies become more pronounced. However, if
the increase in γ is suﬃciently strong to exceed the threshold ¯ γ, ex-post ineﬃciencies
disappear. A further increase of γ has no inﬂuence on either R&D investment, or the
start-up generation process. Put diﬀerently, when complementary assets are scarce, a
gradual increase in their availability has strictly negative eﬀects on eﬃciency, whereas
when complementary assets are abundant adding more of them has no eﬀects. For the
intermediate cases, the way eﬃciency changes depends on the eﬀects of R&D expenses.
If R&D investment has a slow market expanding eﬀect, then an increase of γ across
the ¯ γ threshold leads to the elimination of ex-post ineﬃciencies and to a reduction of
the ex-ante under-investment. Accordingly, in this case a policy aimed at increasing
the availability of complementary assets has indeed a clear-cut positive impact. In the
case of a fast market expanding eﬀect, a trade-oﬀ has to be faced in the sense that
increasing γ across ¯ γ eliminates ex-post ineﬃciencies but worsens the problem of the
ex-ante under-investment. Therefore, general statements about the size of the overall
impact of an increase in γ on total proﬁts can not be made without being more speciﬁc
about the demand structure.
Recalling the economic interpretations of the parameter γ discussed in Section 2,
our results suggest that in markets in which incumbent ﬁrms have suﬃcient market
8It should be noted that reverse ex-post ineﬃciencies, in the sense that a start-up is formed although
it is detrimental for industry proﬁts, never occur in our setup since we only consider scenarios in which
start-up formation increases total proﬁts.
9Measures aimed at improving the development of private equity markets, and programs directed
at creating incubators or innovation parks, are primary examples of policies geared toward increasing
the availability of assets required for successful start-up formation.
18power to restrict access of potential entrants to key assets (e.g. software industry,
energy trading)10, a relatively small number of start-ups should be observed, while
the investment of the dominant ﬁrms in innovative activities should be relatively high.
This argument supports the Schumpeterian view that market concentration is positively
correlated to the intensity of innovative activities.
In the opposite case, in which complementary assets become ‘freely’ available for
potential start-up founders (i.e. γ approaches one), ex-post ineﬃciencies disappear,
but there is signiﬁcant ex-ante under-investment11. These conclusions hold true no
matter whether strong competition among providers of complementary assets shifts
all the bargaining power to the start-up founder, or the availability of complementary
assets is due to government programs facilitating start-up formation. Accordingly, our
ﬁndings give a direct indication of the impact of policy programs that make the needed
complementary assets available to potential start-up founders. As we have shown, the
introduction of such programs may have a positive impact by reducing both ex-ante
and ex-post ineﬃciencies, but under certain circumstances it may diminish the R&D
investments of incumbents.
Until now our discussion has focused on the role of the availability of complementary
assets. A second parameter that can be inﬂuenced by policy measures is the bargaining
power ξ of the ﬁrm when negotiating with its R&D employee. Under the assumption
that this parameter is mainly determined by the ﬁrm’s options to replace the key
R&D employee, a high value of ξ can be seen as the expression of a strong supply of
qualiﬁed R&D employees in the labor market. In this perspective, our results indicate
that an increase in the supply of R&D employees moves the threshold ¯ γ to the right,
and therefore makes it more likely that no start-up is formed and ex-post ineﬃciencies
occur. Whether the increase in ex-post ineﬃciencies is paired with positive or negative
eﬀects with respect to ex-ante under-investment depends on whether R&D investment
has a fast or slow market expanding eﬀect.
On the one hand, the observation that policies leading to an increase in the availabil-
ity of complementary assets and in the supply of potential R&D employees may have
detrimental eﬀects on innovative activities and industry proﬁts indicates that these
policies should be applied with caution. On the other hand, the observations made
within the framework of this model should be treated with appropriate reservations.
As already stated in the Introduction, policy measures such as those discussed above
have a number of eﬀects that lie outside the scope of this paper, such as the facilitation
of industry agglomeration, the improved productivity of future R&D investments, or
the future improvement of knowledge ﬂows in the industry. Many of these eﬀects posi-
tively inﬂuence R&D activities and industry proﬁts, thereby generating trade-oﬀs with
the eﬀects discussed here. In this paper we do not provide a complete analysis of these
trade-oﬀs, but we point out that policies – typically regarded as innovation-friendly –
can be associated with negative strategic eﬀects.
A main drawback of our static model structure is that the dynamic eﬀects of start-
up formation on the evolution of competition and industry structure, as well as future
knowledge ﬂows, can not be captured. Developing and analyzing models combining
10In our model this situation corresponds to a small value of γ.
11Note that as far as ex-post ineﬃciencies are concerned the possibility of internal ﬁnancing corre-
sponds to the limit case in which γ approaches one.
19dynamic features with the strategic eﬀects considered here is a challenging area for
future research. Furthermore, the predictions of our analysis concerning the eﬀects of
the availability of complementary assets on incumbents’ R&D investments could be the
theoretical starting point for empirical and experimental work.
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Appendix A
In this Appendix we use a quality-augmented duopoly model with linear demand (see
Symeonidis (2003)) to qualitatively exemplify the eﬀects characterized in our general
analysis and gain a better understanding of the diﬀerences between slow and fast market
expanding eﬀects.
We consider a market in which, without start-ups, the incumbent acts as a mo-
nopolist. Consumers have quality augmented Dixit-Stiglitz-type utility functions. The
corresponding inverse market demand is given by
pm







F denotes the quality of the good oﬀered. Marginal costs are constant and










E,  > 0,
and the investment needed to generate KE is given by
I(KE) = ιKν
E, ν > 1,ι > 0.
Accordingly, the proﬁt function reads
πm







In case a start-up is formed, the quality of the product the incumbent’s can oﬀer
on the market is only
us
F = (δKE)µ, (11)










E) the prices and quantities of the incumbent and of the start-up in case a
start-up is generated, the inverse demand system reads
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The parameter σ ∈ [0,2] determines the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation, where
lower σ values correspond to a higher degree of diﬀerentiation. The constant marginal
production costs of the start-up are denoted by cE and we assume that, due to learning
curve eﬀects, the start-up’s marginal production costs are larger or equal than those of
the incumbent, i. e. cE ≥ cF. Assuming that the two ﬁrms engage in quantity compe-
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume also that the cost of providing the complementary
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E. (16)
It is easy to check that these functional forms satisfy all assumptions made in our
general analysis.
The elasticity of ∆πF is constant and given by
ǫF(KE) = 2 , (17)
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It should be noted that the Condition (18) for a slow market expanding eﬀect is inde-
pendent from the values of all demand and cost parameters, as it depends only on the
elasticity of the product quality and on the cost of providing the complementary assets
with respect to the stock of knowledge KE. If the elasticity of product quality with
respect to knowledge is high relative to the elasticity of the costs of complementary
assets, proﬁts on the market (monopoly and duopoly proﬁts) are growing with KE at
a higher rate than the costs of the required complementary assets. Accordingly, the
marginal positive eﬀects of knowledge investment on net industry proﬁts are smaller
for low than for high investment levels, and we have a slow market expanding eﬀect of
investments. For small values of   these eﬀects are reversed and we have a fast market
expanding eﬀect.
Figures 2 - 5 are based on the linear example described above with parameter values
a = 0.005, λ = 1.5, ι = 0.05, ν = 3, σ = 0.7, cF = 0.2, cE = 0.25, δ = 0.9, ξ = 0.5.
The condition for a slow market expanding eﬀect is   ≥ 0.75: we set   = 1 to illustrate
cases with a slow market-expanding eﬀect, and   = 0.5 for the cases with a fast market-
expanding eﬀect.
23Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 1
(i). Follows directly from (6).






, the concavity of
Hm and (6). The second is obvious as ¯ KE,s does not depend on γ.
(iii). We show that ¯ KE,m > ¯ KE,s for γ = 0 and ¯ KE,m < ¯ KE,s for γ = 1. If
γ = 0 then
d(Hm−Hs)
dKE =-ξG′ (KE;0) > 0 by Assumption 2. Hence,
d(Hm( ¯ KE,s;0))
dKE > 0,
which implies ¯ KE,m > ¯ KE,s. If γ = 1 then
d(Hm−Hs)
dKE = −ξG′ ￿ ¯ KE,s;1
￿
< 0 again by
Assumption 2. Hence,
d(Hm( ¯ KE,s;1))
dKE < 0, which implies ¯ KE,m < ¯ KE,s. The third claim
follows from the monotonicity of ¯ KE,m − ¯ KE,s with respect to γ.
(iv). Consider an arbitrary ξ ∈ (0,1). For γ = ˆ γ we have ¯ KE,m = ¯ KE,s. Therefore,
H′
m( ¯ KE,s; ˆ γ) = H′
s( ¯ KE,s;ˆ γ) = 0, which implies
H′
m( ¯ KE,s; ˆ γ) − H′
s( ¯ KE,s;ˆ γ) = −ξG′( ¯ KE,s;ˆ γ) = 0.
Accordingly, it must hold that G′( ¯ KE,s;ˆ γ) = 0. Since ¯ KE,s does not depend on ξ this
implies that H′
m( ¯ KE,s; ˆ γ) = 0 for all ξ ∈ (0,1) and therefore ˆ γ does not depend on ξ.
2
Proof of Proposition 2
(i). K∗




















= ξ∆πF( ¯ KE,s)
> 0,

































> 0 we set ¯ γ = 1 and K∗
E (γ) = ¯ KE,m for all γ ∈ (0,1].
Otherwise, there exists a unique ¯ γ ∈ (0,1] such that Hm






and the ﬁrst claim of the proposition follows.
(ii). From the deﬁnition of ¯ KE,m and K
eff






F(KE) − (ξγ + 1)∆π′
E(KE)
< 0
24it follows that ¯ KE,m < K
eff
E . Analogously, we obtain ¯ KE,s < K
eff
E . These two in-




Proof of Proposition 3
Consider ﬁrst the case in which knowledge has a slow market expanding eﬀect. Taking
into account Lemma 1 and Proposition 2, all we have to show is that ¯ γ > ˆ γ. Note ﬁrst









for all KE > 0. Furthermore, it has been shown in the proof of Lemma 1 (iv) that








Hm( ¯ KE,m(ˆ γ); ˆ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,s)
= Hm( ¯ KE,s; ˆ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,s)
= ξ
￿












where the last inequality follows from (19). Accordingly, for γ = ˆ γ no start-up is formed
in the SPNE, and we must have ¯ γ > ˆ γ.
The proof that ¯ γ < ˆ γ when knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect proceeds
along the same lines as above, where it has to be taken into account that if knowledge
has a fast market expanding eﬀect then





∆πE( ¯ KE,s) < 0.
The claim concerning ¯ KE,m follows directly. 2
Proof of Proposition 5
We ﬁrst state and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 9
(i) P∗
F (γ) is single valued and continuous on (0,1];
25(ii) P∗
E (γ) is single valued and continuous for γ  = ¯ γ.
Proof
(i). For γ  = ¯ γ there is a unique SPNE, and therefore P∗
F (γ) is single-valued. For γ =
¯ γ, there are coexisting equilibria with and without start-up but, due to the deﬁnition
of ¯ γ, the proﬁt of the ﬁrm is the same in both equilibria. Hence, P∗
F (γ) is single-valued
and continuous.
(ii). The fact that P∗
E (γ) is single-valued follows immediately from the uniqueness











Hm( ¯ KE,m(γ);γ) γ < ¯ γ
Hs( ¯ KE,s) otherwise.







= −ξ∆πE(KF,m(γ)) < 0.
For γ ≥ ¯ γ the claim follows from the independence of Hs from γ.
(ii). The claim follows directly from Equation 2, as for γ > ¯ γ a start-up is formed
in equilibrium, the ﬁrm’s investment level is constant in γ and the corresponding em-
ployee’s payoﬀ is given by P22
E = P32
E .
(iii). If γ < ¯ γ, the employee’s payoﬀ is given by
P∗
E (γ) = ξP21
E + (1 − ξ)P31
E
= γ∆πs








E (γ) = ¯ γ∆πs
E( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ)) − (1 − ξ)G





E (γ) = ¯ γ∆πs
E( ¯ KE,s).
From Proposition 3, we know that if knowledge has a fast market expanding eﬀect then
¯ KE,m(¯ γ) > ¯ KE,s. Furthermore,
G









(Hm( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,s)
= 0,
26where the inequality follows from the deﬁnition of ¯ KE,s and the last equality from the
deﬁnition of ¯ γ. Taking G
￿ ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ
￿
≤ 0 into account, the strict monotonicity of









Proof of Lemma 6
By deﬁnition of ¯ γ, we have Hm





= 0. Implicit diﬀerentiation
of Hm









−G( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ)
ξ∆πE( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ))
=
Hm( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ))
ξ2∆πE( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ))
.
The denominator of this expression is positive. Concerning the numerator, we observe
that for all ¯ γ  = ˆ γ we have ¯ KE,m(¯ γ)  = ¯ KE,s, and therefore
Hm( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ)) > Hm( ¯ KE,m(¯ γ); ¯ γ) − Hs( ¯ KE,s) = 0.
This implies,
∂¯ γ
∂ξ > 0 for ¯ γ  = ˆ γ and
∂¯ γ
∂ξ = 0 for ¯ γ = ˆ γ. 2
Proof of Proposition 7
Denote by ˜ γ the limit of ¯ γ for ξ → 0. Since ¯ γ is monotonic with respect to ξ (Lemma
6) and has to be in [0,1] for all ξ > 0 the limit exists and ˜ γ ∈ [0,1]. Furthermore, for
any γ < ˜ γ we must have γ < ¯ γ for all ξ ∈ (0,1), which implies by Proposition 2 that no
start-up is formed. On the other hand, if γ > ˜ γ then by monotonicity of ¯ γ with respect
to ξ, there must either exist a ¯ ξ ∈ (0,1] such that ¯ γ(ξ) = γ for ξ = ¯ ξ or ¯ γ(ξ) < γ for all
ξ ∈ [0,1], where we set ¯ ξ = 1 in the latter case. We obtain that ¯ γ(ξ) ≤ γ if and only if
ξ ≤ ¯ ξ and the claim of the Proposition follows from Proposition 2. 2
Proof of Proposition 8
(i). Follows directly from the discussion in the text.





27is negative, which follows from Assumption 2.
In order to show that ˜ KF,s > K∗
F for all γ ∈ (0,1), note ﬁrst that
˜ Hs(KE;γ) − Hs(KE;γ) = ξ(1 − γ)∆πE(KE).
By Assumption 2, we have
∂( ˜ Hs(KE;γ) − Hs(KE;γ))
∂KE
= ξ(1 − γ)∆π′
E(KE) > 0.
This implies ˜ KF,s > ¯ KE,s. Furthermore,
˜ Hs(KE;γ) − Hm(KE;γ) = ξ(∆πE(KE) − ∆πF(KE)),
which again by Assumption 2 implies ˜ KF,s > ¯ KE,m. Hence, ˜ KF,s > K∗
F for all γ ∈ (0,1).
Finally, ˜ KF,s < K
eff
E follows by taking into account the deﬁnition of ˜ KF,s,K
eff
E and
noting that direct calculation shows that
∂( ˜ Hs(KE;γ) − (πF,s(KE) + πE,s(KE) − I(KE)))
∂KE
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